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The scientific methodology of Operations Research is used to
derive a philosophical model of man, and then, to demonstrate its
application to the solution of American political problems. A cyber-
netic model is presented as a suitable framework for analysis of a
political system. The necessity for continual innovation in a political
system is demonstrated by analogy to the error- correcting feedback
function in a communications network. Finally, it is attempted to
show by probabilistic analogy that the only certain basis for net
positive progress is control of decision-making processes by the
freely expressed and broadly based preferences of an autonomous,
informed citizenry. Throughout the paper an attempt is made to dis-
tinguish between inalterable goals on the one hand and opportune





It is with sincere humility and apology for its many shortcomings
,
both acknowledged and unrecognized, that this thesis is dedicated
to Professor Charles Chapman Torrance who convinced me that a
thesis of this nature could be attempted using methods of Operations
Analysis
.
He is a teacher of the school which Will Durant has described
as "loving life enough to let it humanize their teaching." His philos-
ophy is one of constantly and urgently seeking better answers to the
meaningful questions of life. Further, and perhaps more important,
his teaching is characterized by a constant striving for new and better
methods to apply to the search. But his greatest contribution, in an
environment characterized by the search for practical answers to mun-
dane, even minute, questions, has been the inspiration and challenge
to ask better questions. His great talent, and his mission, has been
to lead students to identify and illuminate the real issues in complex
problems, so that their solutions are not hampered by irrele?vancies
.
Those who know Professor Torrance will quickly recognize that
this attempt is not worthy of his challenge. To the extent that any
light is shed, the credit is properly his. Where the mark is missed,
the fault lies solely with the author.
The patience and encouragement of Professor William Peyton
Cunningham, who acted as second reader, is gratefully acknowledged.
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I am not an advocate for frequent changes in laws and con-
stitutions . But laws and institutions must go hand in hand with
the progress of the human mind. As that becomes more developed,
more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths dis-
covered and manners and opinions change , with the change of
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Some of the outstanding characteristics of American legislatures
are caution and conservatism, unwillingness to experiment, and in-
ability to cast free from conventional ties — all of which serve to
preserve the status quo and prevent rapid response to new legislative
requirements. Political patronage and emasculating compromise often
supplant basic principles in the legislative processes. Reflection and
reappraisal in the light of long range objectives is generally left to
philosophers and political scientists whose pronouncements , though
sometimes revered, seldom form the basis for systematic and purpose-
ful analysis of existing and needed laws. Perhaps inefficiency is in-
evitable or even necessary to our political system. On the other hand,
it is just possible that some of the impedementa we have inherited
are no longer relevant (perhaps never were) and can be shucked off
without detriment to the essential system. This paper is concerned
not so much with the answer to this question as with the methodology
of its analysis
.
The rules of conduct established and enforced by a society have
since the earliest recorded history been to a large degree formalized
as laws or statutes. In a democratic society these laws are neither
absolute nor static, but a dynamic evolution which is continuously
remolded by the forces of social change. The purpose of this paper
is to analyze the evolutionary process and to seek generic methods
for its improvement. We shall call the process legislative and its
product legislation, but the scope is by no means limited to the legis-
lature per se. A democratic legislature shares power and responsibility
for making authoritative social decisions (laws in the broadest sense)
with the chief executive, the courts, the bureaucracy, the political
parties, and the public (largely in the form of organized private in-
terests). That is, if we consider law as the recorded rules of human
behavior which can be read and known, and which are enforced by
organized society, then we must include, in addition to the laws
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passed by the legislature, the decisions of courts, the decrees and
orders of the executive, and the regulations and rulings of adminis-
trative agencies. Thus the discussion and analysis of this paper will
concern itself with the entire decision-making process which has




actions and behavior", "deciding who gets what, hen, and how",
and "authoritatively allocating values for society".
Although much of the paper will be addressed to a general decision-
making methodology which should be equally applicable to legislation
at any level (eg. , national, state, and local) and in any democratic
society, primary attention will be focused on the American National
legislative process as it is practiced today. Our major concern is
with the positive aspects of the political process — defining proper
goals and molding institutions and legislation for their implementation.
The judicial review and interpretive role of the courts, albeit an
essential potential force for the prevention of error, will be considered
only at its periphery. For our purpose it will be assumed that "good"
legislation and administration will minimize the necessity for the courts
to exercise their steering and braking influence
.
The environment within and on which the legislative process must
operate is increasingly more complex: The crowding of populating into
urban-suburban-industrial supercities with attendant increased social
interdependence and stress shows no sign of abatement. The influence
of the family as an agent for social direction and regulation is waning.
Integration of the nation's industry and commerce, in addition to in-
creasing the individual's mobility, demands extended regulation. The
rising expectations of the lowest economic and social strata have
created a foreboding unrest and a rash of civil disobedience in our
Catlin, G.E.G. , A Study of the Principles of Politics (London:
Allen and Unwin, 1930)
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The Political System (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1953)
larger cities. Increasing recognition of our supra-national respon-
sibilities has broadened the base for legislative application. The
rapid pace of scientific and technological advancement creates new
dimensions for social decisions. For example, ingenious devices
capable of furtive invasion of individual and corporate privacy pro-
liferate; serious probing of previously inaccessible environments, both
outer space and ocean depths, is a reality.
Our political institutions, at the heart of which lies the legislative
process, will be sorely tried by the inevitable expanding scope and
complexity of the social and economic problems which must be solved.
Many questions arise! Can our Nationcsurvive as an autonomous entity?
Is our political process capable of the rapid and purposeful response to
legislative requirements which will be required? If not, what changes
are needed and are we capable ,and willing to institute them ?
But there are deeper ^and therefore more important questions which
many will avoid by asserting their answers to be axiomatic or self-
evident. What is meant by National survival? Is it, in the final
analysis, the preservation of an autonomous United States of America
that we desire above all else? What price are we willing to pay?
Perhaps it is our political heritage that must survive at all cost. All
of it? If not, then which parts are essential? Political equality and
popular soverignty? The Federal system (State's Rights)? Separation
of Powers? The rule of Laws and not of Men? Or perhaps the essence
is social -- or economic. Equality? In what sense? Laisseze Faire?
Capitalism? Free Enterprise? Enthusiastic and emotional support
could be rallied for any and perhaps all of these in any representative
group of Americans. They are all to a greater or lesser extent incor-
porated in the hallmark of our proud heritage. The question becomes
one of separating the means from the ends — of discerning which are
inalterable goals and which are simply methods which deserve our
allegiance only so long as they contribute effectively to the higher
purpose. Inheritance and long association are not proper criteria for
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distinction. Do we dare admit the possibility that all may be simply
means to some higher end toward which we strive (or should strive)
endlessly? This point should be clear: The selection of Ultimate
goals, or more clearly, the assignment of priorities to possible goals,
must remain a subjective
,
(and for most a speculative/, process. But
having determined a goal, the means for its accomplishment can be
selected somewhat less subjectively by a rational observer.
The reader may conclude, and not without some justification, that
this paper is concerned with political science, philosophy, or even
ethics rather than operations research or systems analysis. The writer
has been much impressed by the inter-disciplinary methodology which
is variously called operations analysis, operations research, and at
some levels, systems analysis. This methodology, which is new only
in its formalization as an integrated, general approach to complex prob-
lem solving, has grown out of rapidly increasing technological and
scientific complexity which has so greatly increased the details bear-
ing on management decisions as to render it virtually impossible to
rely on traditional methods in prosecuting the objectives of modern
organizations. Operations analysis has increasingly demonstrated its
capability for helping management solve complex problems and make
major decisions through application of a logical analytical method-
ology. There are few fields of greater complexity (and importance
than political science, or more specifically, governmental decision-
making. In spite of (if not because of) the uncertainties, not only of
the best methods of achieving political objectives, but also of what
political goals should be or even what they are
,
there is compelling
motivation for an attempt to bring the scientific methodology of
operations research 'as well as all other available resources' to bear
on the area of political decision-making. Admittedly, the applicability
of operations research in its current form is limited. The variables of
politics are in general, not quantifiable, rooted as they are in human
behavior. Existing analytical techniques will require considerable
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extension to deal effectively with the qualitative systems. But the
essential spirit is applicable; it is the spirit of science.
The extent to which political analysis can be treated as a science
rather than an art is a subject of considerable debate among contem-
porary students of politics. Political scientist Robert Alan Dahl of
Yale University sees it as both:
To the extent that many aspects of political analysis are most
easily acquired by practice and training under the supervision
of a person already skilled in political analysis, it is an art.
Whenever students of politics scrupulously test their gen-
eralizations and theories against the data of experience by
means of meticulous observation, classification, and
measurement, then political analysis is scientific in its
approach. To the extent that this approach actually yields
tested propositions of considerable generality, political
analysis can be regarded as scientific in its results.
^
Operations research is not concerned with techniques of marginal
improvement. Rather, it is concerned with major, even revolutionary,
improvement. That is to say, with optimal design of total systems.
To the extent that we approach political analysis without prejudice
for or against existing ideas or institutions, but are willing to examine
the entire range of possible alternatives, and to the extent that we
attempt to predict and compare short and long range values, effective-
nesses, and costs of all alternatives in the hope that better under-
standing will lead to better decisions, we are engaged in operations
research.
In a recent book on the subject, Eugene J. Meehan has this to say:
Systematic human thought quite literally and necessarily
implies a methodological foundation, and every attempt
at intellectual criticism that moves beyond the bare con-
futation of data necessarily involves some reference to
the terms of this substructure. Thought may proceed un-
aware of the methodological assumptions on which it rests;
4
Dahl, R.A., Modern Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963) p. 2
Johnson, E.A., Introduction to Operations Research for Manage-
ment, by McCloskey, J.F. and Trefethen, F.N. (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins Press, 1954) p. xx
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it cannot proceed without the assumptions themselves.
Later he speaks even more to the point:
Modern analytic techniques , though they cannot offer
"final" solutions to our problems, can most certainly
provide the tools needed to clarify the nature of the
enterprise, and stabilize the search for reliable knowl-
edge; they have not been used to full advantage within
the discipline [political science] J
Meehan, E.J. , The Theory and Method of Political Analysis





2. A Model far Decision.
This paper is concerned with making decisions in government. In
politics, as in business and in personal life, decisions are influenced
by certain appraisals which in the abstract are the same no matter
what area or level (general or specific) is involved. Dahl has analyzed
Q
these aspects of decision-making in considerable detail. His
categories are:
1. The alternatives "open" or "available".
2. The likely consequences of each alternative.
3. The value assigned to the consequences of each alternative.
4. Estimates of the relative probability of the consequences.
5. Attitudes toward risk and uncertainty.
When the available alternatives and their consequences are known
with certainty, !or near certainty
, a "rational" decision can be made
by the simple process of selecting that alternative which ranks highest
on an "appropriate" value scale. The process might be called one
of applying "common sense" to a selection opportunity. There is little
need for an awareness of methodology — the appraisals on which such
a choice is based may be unconscious, virtually reflexive. The scale
of values on which the consequences are ranked may be so deeply
ingrained through habitual use as to seem beyond question, or even
recall. Yet in spite of its simplicity, the essence of the decision- ..
.
making process is illustrated by this example. To complete the
picture, we need only introduce uncertainty. Uncertainty can and
often does affect each of the first three categories and thereby renders
the casual "common sense" approach ineffective. Each of the five
categories is worthy of examination in understanding the complete
model for decision.
The quality of a decision is inescapably a function of the extent
g
Dahl, Op. Cit., pp. 94-100
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to which the alternatives are known and explored. To be considered,
an alternative must be known to exist, the actions which it specifies
must be achievable, ^at least with high probability.' , and it must be
relevant 'i.e. , it must somehow be related to the scale of values to
be used in the ranking^ . One of the important purposes of political
analysis is to increase the range and awareness of feasible alter-
natives. Familiar alternatives may indeed be good, but it is often
the case that a radically different approach offers order-of-magnitude
improvement. Science, together with speculation and chance dis-
coveries, opens up new alternatives (and often closes out old ones' .
Political philosophy offers countless imaginative speculation, much
of it Utopian, but nevertheless valuable in enlarging the range of
alternatives. Yesterday's Utopian thinking may well be tomorrow's
conservatism.
The choices that people make among alternative courses of action
in all spheres of life reflect their expectations or predictions concern-
ing the consequences. Referring to our previous listing, the second
and the fourth factors affecting the quality of decision-making are
(under uncertainty) predictions based on factual or empirical knowledge
These are clearly dependent on the amount and validity of available
factual information. The distinctive element of political phenomena
is that they consist of or result from the actions of human beings. An
effort to explain these phenomena is thus an effort to explain certain
kinds of human behavior. But human and social behavior do not
readily yield to predictive techniques. As a consequence, predictive
knowledge used in making political decisions is often known to be at
a relatively low level of reliability. Nevertheless, it is to this very
need that the scientific method may have its greatest applicability.
What is needed here, and we postulate not that it can be done, but
only that it is well worth the attempt., is a descriptive, empirically-
oriented, behavioral, operational or causal theory. Until very
recently political theory has been virtually indistinguishable from
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political philosophy; it has been oriented toward understanding the
"true" nature of life. As David Easton puts it:
Traditionally,
. . .
.analysis of the moral rather than of the
strictly empirical world has stood at the peak of theory's
hierarchy of priorities
. . .
.Recent developments in the
overall orientation of political science, largely character-
ized by its reception of more rigorous methods of research
and analysis , have led to a radical transformation in con-
ceptions of the tasks and functions of theory. Not that
this change involves rejecting or discarding any of the
historical concerns of theory or for that matter of adding
any entirely new dimensions. Rather, it has led to the
injection of a new and stronger emphasis on concerns
that out of neglect and untimeliness have been allowed
to lie unattended. . . .It now becomes possible for theory
to escape the shackles imposed by so narrow a perspec-
tive and to broaden its scope to include a serious and
systematic concern for descriptive theory. 9
The goal is phrased clearly by Vernon Van Dyke of Stanford Univer-
sity:
We can say that the purpose is to account for and, in so
far as possible, predict political conditions and events.
. .
.
The purpose should be to explain and predict — to
establish relationships between thought and action, means
and ends, cause and effect, conditions and consequences. 10
That the requirement has long been recognized is demonstrated by
Hobbes 1 observation that the purpose should be to gain and impart
"knowledge of consequences, and dependence of one fact upon
another". Or, as John Stuart Mill said, the part of the "scientific
9
Easton, D., A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York:
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965) pp. 4-5
Van Dyke, V. , Political Science: A Philosophical Analysis
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1960) p. 4
Quoted by Murray, A.R.M. , An Introduction to Political
Philosophy (London: Cohen and Weat, 1953) p. 93
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observer and reasoner" should be "to show that certain consequen-
ces follow from certain causes and that, to obtain certain ends,
12
certain means are the most effectual.
"
One aspect of science should be emphasized in our discussion
of descriptive theory. Science seeks to establish relationships be-
tween certain phenomena on the basis of knowledge already in our
possession. It is concerned only with human perceptions to be order-
ed and arranged as best we can. It neither seeks nor requires any
assertion about the nature of "reality" that goes beyond the ordering
and classification of empirical or observable properties. Scientific
theories and laws are not discoveries of "absolute truths" but human
creations, conditional, approximate, and valid only so long as and to
the extent that they serve useful purposes . When better explanations
appear, old ones are absorbed or discarded; there are no final solutions
Science is characterized by a "skepticism" which refuses to accept
any knowledge as complete or beyond question. In Meehan's words:
Certainly the scientist would be delighted to have an
all-encompassing logical structure in which every
observation would fit nicely, but science has no way
of knowing that such a structure is possible, and even
if it were achieved, science would have no grounds
for asserting the achievement. 13
In the case of politics, knowledge is even more limited and partial
than in the physical sciences. Scientific theories must be systematic,
general and verifiable. Van Dyke comments:
The problem for political scientists is that the more they
insist on verifiability the more difficult it is to develop
generalizations , and the further they go toward high
levels of generality the more difficult it is to verify
what is said. Roughly, the dilemma is whether to put
the stress on saying what is important or saying what
is true. 14
12 Quoted by Brecht, A. , Political Theory (Princeton: Princeton






Van Dyke, Op. Cit., p. x
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But political decisions must be made punctually regardless of the level
of scientific validity of our empirical knowledge. For others will
decide for us what we fail to decide for ourselves. Thus, political
decisions must, perhaps more often than not, be based on very in-
complete factual information. This should not lead us to deny the
role of science in the descriptive and predictive analysis of politics,
but alert to its limitations , to wring from its methodology all the
assistance and understanding which can be extracted.
Finally, in rational decision-making, values are of crucial im-
portance. Without some criterion or standard against which to measure
and compare consequences of various alternatives, rational choice is
impossible. Even decision by the toss of a coin implies a value judg-
ment in the sense that positive, purposeful goals are denied applic-
ability. Of course values need not be articulate nor even conscious
to be employed. When we buy an automobile we may be unable to state
precisely what values we applied to arrive at the "best" choice be-
tween available models. Many people are only vaguely aware of the
criteria they apply in choosing between candidates or propositions in
an election. It should be clear that the quality of one's appraisals,
and thus the "correctness" of the decisions toward which they lead,
depends in large measure on one's values and one's capacity for
applying these values to the various possible outcomes. The source of
these values — where they come from, and where they ought to come
from, and by deduction, what they are and what they ought to be' — is
the concern of political philosophy. This vital aspect of the decision
process is taken up in the next section. For our present purposes, we
may assume that ultimate values have been specified outside the
decision-making process.
Assuming that we have determined "proper" values, or at least
the best we are capable of, it is imperative to relate them rationally
to an evaluation of the available alternatives. The concept of ration-
ality used here was expressed by Dahl and Lindblom:
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An action is rational to the extent that it is "correctly"
designed to maximize goal achievement. . . .Given more
than one goal (the usual human situation) , an action
is rational to the extent that it is correctly designed
to maximize net goal achievement. 15
In politics as in all endeavors, immediate, intermediate, and
ultimate purposes are more likely to be achieved if they are identified.
Even when they are identified they often receive little attention in the
press of a multiplicity of more expedient considerations. Van Dyke
comments on this point:
It may not always be necessary for [legislators] to be
articulate about the rationale of their activity. Those
possessed with a good intuition or inspired by the
right example may make good choices regularly even
though they are no more than dimly aware of the cri-
teria of judgment which they employ. In the main,
however, it seems probable that choices will be better
if they are made thoughtfully on the basis of explicit-
ly formulated standards of judgment. 16
And even more relevant to the legislative considerations of this paper:
In the absence of a clear sense of purpose -- and a
sense of logic which indicates what is relevant to the
purpose -- legislation is likely to consist of a pot-
pourri of unnecessary regulations or a robot-like
imitation of a conventional pattern. Conventional
patterns are sometimes quite good, of course. Purpose-
ful and cogent thought may lead to their deliberate
endorsement. The point here is that choices [relating
to] purpose, whatever they may be, should be discrim-
inating and not automatic or unthinkingly imitative. 17
When ultimate goals are expressed (as they must be) at high levels
of generalization, it is usually convenient, even imperative, to de-
rive by logical deduction intermediate and immediate goals which are
more nearly attainable than broad principles and which in summation
Dahl, R.A. and Lindblom , C.E., Politics, Economics, and
Welfare (New York: Harper, 195 3) p. 38
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are estimated to provide the best means for promoting the ultimate goals
under a given set of circumstances. The result is a structure of sub-
ordinate goals in which objectives at each level are not ends in them-
selves but rather means which are expected to contribute to achieve-
ment of objectives at the next higher level.
Herbert Simon describes the situation as follows:
The fact that goals may be dependent for their force on
other more distant ends leads to the arrangement of
these goals in a hierarchy — each level to be con-
sidered as an end relative to the levels below it and
as a means relative to the levels above it.
. .
.
A means-end chain is a series of anticipations that
connect a value with the situation realizing it, and
these situations, in turn, with the behaviors that
produce them. Any element in this chain may be
either "means" or "ends" depending on whether its
connection with the value end of the chain, or its
connection with the behavior end of the chain, is
in question. 18
Kenneth E. Boulding [ 4 ] relates the famous story of a production
manager who said that all he wanted to do was to minimize costs,
until it was pointed out that the easiest way to do this would be to
shut down operations altogether, in which case the costs would be
reduced to zero. This illustrates that the fulfillment of subordinate
goals can easily be inimical to the fulfillment of larger goals and
ultimate 1 values i -i - s
.
The problem is to maintain means and ends in proper perspective,
examining each one regularly and carefully in relation to higher goals
.
Lacking this constant re-evaluation, what is initially endorsed as a
method of promoting tacitly accepted values may come to be regarded
as an end in itself, to the possible (and likely) detriment of the more
correct goal. Even when values are stable, a set of rules that will
18
Simon, H.A., Administrative Behavior, 2d ed., (New York:
MacMillan, 1957) pp. 67, 102
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maximize the attainment of these goals in one situation might be en-
tirely unsuitable in another. Thus changing circumstances emphasize
the need for continuous review of subordinate ends and means.
Analytic objectivity is essential for empirical inquiry and for
subsequent descriptive and predictive analyses, but not to an extent
which precludes reaching conclusions and answering questions. The
tools and methodology of science and logic can be considered "value
free" (except in that their selection places value on rational thought)
and thus capable of objective analysis. Objectivity dictates the
adoption of attitudes and practices that are generally accepted so that
replication by other qualified analysts would lead to approximately the
same results. Among these requirements are the following:
1. Use of generally accepted criteria in judging which data is
relevant and reliable;
2. Thoroughness in locating and developing the data;
3. Use of generally acceptable criteria in assigning relevant
significance to the data (i.e. , weighting factors);
4. Rational, logical determination of the answers, if any, which
the data will support.
An objective approach does not guarantee correct answers, but it
does exclude, to the maximum extent possible, invalidation by
systematic bias
.
Postponing as we have the selection of goals for later consider-
ation, the major portion of this section has been devoted to what might
be called the descriptive analysis function of the decision-making
process. We have been concerned with the observation of empirical
facts, and development, based on these and other relevant facts, of
correlative or explanative interrelationships within and among ends
and means in a specified environment. Next we considered the
predictive stage in which the empirically-derived functional relation-
ship is applied to the feasible set of parametric alternatives. The
hoped-for output of the analysis is a set of estimated measures of
-20-
value or value indices for each alternative, by means of which they
may be compared. As the final step in the decision-making process,
it is necessary to somehow order our preferences for the various
measures of value, perhaps, for example, in the form of indifference
curves. If this much can be accomplished, there remains only the
mechanical-like process of selecting that alternative which offers the
highest net attainment of preferred measures of value.
We have postulated that the methodology and attitude of science
may be useful in enhancing the potential rationality of political action.
It is clear that inductive and deductive logic will be the mainstay, as
in the past. As to the handling of risk and uncertainty, formal logical
systems such as game theory, decision theory and statistics (e.g.
,
regression analysis, discriminant analysis, and factor analysis) are
useful at low levels of generality when relevant variables are quan-
tifiable on a common cardinal scale. As yet they do not appear to be
amenable to the more crucial decisions at levels of generality which
preclude additive measurements. Ordinal (indifference curve) analysis
based on knowledge or specification of preferences, which is widely
used in economics , may extend mathematical treatment to higher levels
of generality. It is not unlikely that mathematics will develop tech-
niques of even greater application to political science.
-21-
3. A Philosophy of Values.
Philosophy has attempted to answer questions concerning ultimate
values and their source since earliest times. There remains a clear
lack, of concensus. The question is more than academic, for it would
be difficult, if not impossible, to conduct an analysis of any political
or social system without postulating a basis for ultimate value judg-
ment. Indeed, rationality itself, as we have defined it, demands an
answer. The unifying theme of this paper is that ultimate goals must
be identified and continually distinguished from supporting inter-
mediate and immediate goals, or better, means. In this section we
shall examine several of the more prevalent philosophies and define
one which will be applied in this analysis.
Dahl identifies five "hotly contested" philosophies of value which
are currently prevalent:
1 . Political values must rest ultimately on God's will as deter-
mined by direct revelation to an individual or agent (as with Moses
and the Ten Commandments) or indirectly by means of reason, in-
tuition, or experience.
2. Political values must rest ultimately on natural laws, which
may or may not be laid down by God. Knowledge of natural law is held
to be acquired through reasoning or intuition.
3. Political values, like other values, can be derived solely by
the methods of the empirical sciences.
4. Political values, like other values, rest simply on preferences
i.e. , values cannot be attributed to Divine will, natural law, or any
"ultimate" justification outside personal preference. Whether this
means that statements of values are "meaningless" is a source of
division within this school.
5. Although values rest simply on preferences, certain kinds of
preferences are probably universal, i.e.
,
inherent in being human.
Hence it should be possible to discover these universal preferences
and to construct political systems consistent with them.
The first three positions postulate values that are "universal"
while the fifth extends the fourth in the direction of a universal
19
Dahl, Op. Cit., pp. 100-101
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invariance. Representing as they do the distillation of centuries jcff
philosophical probing by some of the world's best minds, there is
apparent, at least to this writer, a marvelous harmony. If we take
only their positive tenets we reduce the set of seemingly contrary
philosophies to a small core of totally consistent doctrine which ab-
sorbs each of the individual beliefs without denying their separate
validity. Taken in this manner, we might formulate the following com-
posite, or better, unified philosophy of values in general and thus
political values in particular:
1 . Political values, like other values, rest ultimately on Divine
will. That is, values are, at the highest level, absolute and un-
changing .20
2. Values are reflected in natural laws, and are thus derivable
and verifiable , within the limits of our powers of observation and
inductive reasoning, by the methods of the empirical sciences.
3. Values are inherent in human nature (though perhaps often so
deeply buried as to be imperceptible) so that human preferences,
experiences, and even intuition, taken in the whole, give strong
evidence of. . ."universal and invariant 'inescapable' elements in the
human way of thinking and feeling about ethical values, and espec-
ially about justice". 21
The philosophy just outlined is by no means new. The ancients
patterned their positive law after natural law — the law of the universe
as observed in human behavior, or in science; and they considered
this natural law as the product of a divine law which was the prototype.
Division arose when contending philosophies, and science, interpreted
natural law differently, and saw the link between natural and divine
law in a different light (and sometimes in no light at alll).
The concept of absolute values which permeate the universe is at
least as viable as other philosophical foundations, and capable of a
wider range of explanation of observable phenomena. In accepting the
20
As long as we remain outside the field of religion (as we shall
in this paper) acceptance of God, or Divine will, per se, is not essen-
tial. The concept of a set of transcendent, unchanging laws which are






existence of Absolutes we do not violate the spiritual essence of
science — that theories are only human constructs. For we postulate
an infinite framework within which empirical science is applicable.
The existence theorem gives urgent motivation to scientific (and non-
scientific) experimentation. At the same time, awareness of human
limitations and propensity to error accentuates the need for the skep-
ticism which characterizes science and is the sine qua non of progress.
We might want to postulate, as a corollary to the existence theorem,
an uncertainty principle which states that although we may make pro-
gress in that direction, our knowledge of the Absolute must remain in-
complete and questionable in the finite universe. This is the philosophy
which will be adopted and applied throughout this paper.
If this philosophy is correct, then empirical observation and an-
alysis may be expected to verify and clarify which goals are more
correct, at least within the particular environment of the observations.
The existence theorem has a vital effect on our willingness to
conduct research at both stages of the decision-making process. In
the first stage when we are building the range of possibilities, it
demands that we exhaust the alternative ways of coming to know al-
ternatives. At the second stage, in which the alternatives are sub-
jected to value ordering, acceptance of absolute ethical values, no
matter how imperfect our understanding, breeds dissatisfaction with
currently fashionable objectives in the conviction that it may be
possible to relate values to higher order goals (in the ethical sense).
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4. Relating Values to a Political Order.
In a paper on government, then, the question becomes one of how
to relate our postulated philosophy of values to political goals, in-
stitutions, and finally, decisions. More specifically, how can we
best progress toward a goal which is not known and about which there
is no general concensus?
Let us review our postulated position. There exists an absolute
ethic which although not clearly identified, is universally reflected in
human and physical nature. If we knew the nature of this absolute
ethic (truth, ultimate value, goal, or whatever we choose to call it), it
should clarify all issues and dictate all decisions, at least within our
power to apply the rule rationally. But it is not known. Any individual
may feel he has found the answer to the eternal question through re-
ligion, faith, intuition, or some other process. Indeed, each rational
individual must act as though he knew the answer, for decisions are
unavoidable. Some groups may agree for a time on fundamental goals,
but difference of opinion is the more common human experience at all
levels. But no individual and no group, can be certain about ultimate
values — nor about first principles of government. Yet, from our
postulates, the priority of a search for first principles surpasses all
mundane enterprise.
If there is a harbinger of hope in this sea of uncertainty, it is that
"truth" is both universal and inherent in life. Surely there have been
men, and others will follow, who, with dedication and studied per-
ception, have glimpsed philosophic truths concerning the nature of
man. We can only hope that such visions will become more frequent,
more lucid and more widely accepted. Perhaps the inherent ethic
gives mankind, taken as a whole over the very long view, some slight
predilection to perceive and choose truth, at least when it is presented
as an alternative through the offices of a visionary leader. Our only
hope, however feeble, is to trust in man's collective good judgment.
The probability of progress, as we have described a possible
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mechanism for its propagation, hinges on a delicate balance. From
the theory of probability, we might say that such a system will, in
the long run, produce more good choices than bad ones. Probability, how-
ever insists that the events whose relative frequencies are under con-
sideration must be completely random. In our case, this would mean
that the entire "population" (or at least a large enough portion to con-
stitute a representative sample) must participate in the decision-making
22
process. Clearly, there may be large segments of any population
who habitually make poor decisions. We might conclude, then, that
one way (perhaps the only sure way) to ensure long-term, net positive
progress is to allow each individual to be autonomous in his choices so
that the probability law holds for the summation.
Such a conclusion, however impractical, has vast significance!
Every individual's choices contribute equally (in the a priori sense of
probability theory) to the overall increment of progress. There is no
valldi selection rule by which we may choose a smaller group of in-
dividuals whose decisions will approximate the progress available from
the whole. Probability theory tells us that such a sample would have
to be large, that it must be drawn by completely random processes from
a cross-section of the population, and that we cannot have complete
confidence that the representative group would produce as large a
measure of progress. That is to say that every individual excluded
from the decision-making process makes real progress potentially less
certain.
Have we not developed, given our postulates, an undeniable
rationale for human worth, dignity, and equality, and sufficient
justification and urgency for the individual liberty which is so much
22
" An everyday understanding of 3 the meaning of the probability
terms involved is sufficient here, for the application is more allegori-
cal than actual.
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talked about and so little understood (and practiced)? Is this not a
sufficient basis for Jefferson's "self-evident truths" and his opposition
to tyranny? Not only is every individual entitled to his own opinion
and the right to express it, but every man's opinion is vital to the only
sure process by which the knowledge and practice of truth can be ad-
vanced.
But the real world does not (yet) permit a Utopian society in which
each individual is autonomous. Except in complete isolation, individual
decisions are not independent. Conflicts develop over mutually in-
terfering goals . Powerful individuals and groups enforce their views
,
disrupting the "random" decision process. We need not analyze here
the reasons why men choose to live together in relatively large social
groups. It is sufficient for our purposes to observe that they do, and
that they require governments to provide a mechanism by which conflicts
can be resolved. It is significant that men voluntarily form governments,
which place restrictions on their freedom, in order to preserve their
individual autonomy. Herein lies the age-old dilemma of government —
the delicate balance between governmental power and individual liberty.
Will Durant, in writing of Spinoza's Treatise on Politics, describes
the exchange concisely:
Part of the individual's natural might, or sovereignty, is
handed over to the organized community , in return for
the enlargement of the sphere of his remaining powers. 23
Having decided upon the requirement for government, a people
have an almost unlimited spectrum of forms and degrees from which to
choose, although their culture and circumstance usually narrow the
choice greatly. Much has been written in the attempt to clarify and
classify the fundamental characteristics which distinguish one govern-
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such an analysis here — even were the writer equipped for the task.
Only one dominant characteristic will be considered — the degree of
control which ordinary citizens exert over the decision-making process.
At one end of this scale is literal majority rule with each citizen ex-
ercising an equal vote on every issue, which process is usually called
pure democracy. At the other extreme, of course, lies absolute mon-
archism, in the purest form of which no citizen has even remote in-
fluence except, perhaps, at the pleasure of the ruler. Neither of these
extreme forms exists. In the very special type of representative
democracy which has developed in the United States, decisions are
made by a small group of elected and appointed officials . The degree
to which these officials are controlled by ordinary citizens is, again,
the subject of controversy. To a large extent, the remainder of this
paper is devoted to a consideration of this characteristic of American
democracy. The point to be made here is that in any practical govern-
mental scheme, it would appear that, at least in the very short run,
rule is by a minority — a very small minority. This La. not a criticism,
but simply an empirical fact.
It might be more convenient for purposes of analysis to modify our
definition of the basic functional classification and distinguishing
characteristic of government. Our premise is that every government,
sooner or later, is subject to control by the majority. Indeed, the
majority may refrain from exercising its potential control for many
reasons, among which are: lack of awareness of their capability,
lack of leadership or organization, fear of reprisal in the event of
failure, lack of a better alternative, indifference to political matters,
and satisfaction with the existing order. The instrument of innovation
may vary from gentle persuasion to bloody revolution, and the period
of contention may span centuries. But a majority, given sufficient
exacerbation, can always, in time, effect a change!
If this principle is allowed, we may redefine our standard in terms
of the amount of force and the time required for a majority to bring about
-28-
desired reforms. The criteria might be visualized as one of respon-
siveness. Attention is focused on mechanisms for deciding how far,
or how long, to allow one regime, system, party, or faction to deter-
mine the course of political enterprise, and the measures necessary
to alter a direction once embarked. As an aid to classification and
analysis, this standard appears to offer great flexibility over the full
spectrum of governmental types and levels. For example, it is not
limited to consideration of majority goals, but can be applied equally
well to analyze the degree of influence and control available to
minorities both within and outside an existing "ruling minority". We
turn now to consider the desirability of this characteristic, which we
have called "responsiveness", keeping in mind the specific definition
which was made.
It is fortunate for politics that men, at least some men, are endowed
with a desire for power. The desire is often accompanied by, if not
engendered by, the highest humanitarian and ethical motivation.
Willing leaders, then, will arise out of endowment and circumstance.
Their quality will, of course, vary, both in capacity and vision. We
must assume that, in a society which is free to choose its leaders,
wide participation in the selection process will, on the whole, result
in good leaders. This follows from the law of probability and our
postulate that truth is inherent, even intuitive, and universal in life.
That the widest possible participation is necessary in the se-
lection of leaders should be clear. For if selection is restricted to a
few who are permitted to perpetrate a "ruling class", inbreeding will
accentuate their prominent features — weaknesses as well as strengths.
Decisions made by such a restricted group will not be protected from
error by action of the probability law. In truth, however, the law
does say that eventually a misdirected leadership will be overcome
by an enlightened majority. But the arrangement is clearly not an
effective design for progress.
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Historically, it is clear that power distorts perspective, and
visions fade in the exigencies of action. Leaders appear to be almost
invariably changed by the act of ruling, like a bright star which is
deviated from its true course by recoil from its own radiation. Each
leader in turn takes up the torch to guide a people who eventually,
if not unerringly, sense (with widely varying reaction times) when
each has served his usefulness. Then, by whatever means his culture
and institutions permit, the old leader and vision, now faded, out-
worn, or even onerous, are replaced by the new. The process does
not preclude bad leaders and false visions , both fraudulent and well-
intentioned, but the same rule applies to their overthrow. Each new
tack does not necessarily provide the needed corrective action — there
may be long stretches of digression. But the hope is that over the
long run, positive progress will result.
An effective political system must provide for timely and orderly
selection and replacement of leaders. But the need for responsiveness
is much broader. The requirement encompasses the entire "ruling
minority". In the American system, there is similar need for respon-
siveness throughout the executive branch, in the Congress, in the
bureaucracy, and even in the courts. Further, the responsiveness
principle must be nurtured within the ruling minority to provide for
effective corrective influence before wholesale replacement becomes
necessary.
Supremacy of the individual dictates political responsiveness
at even more fundamental levels. Established institutions and prac-
tices, social, economic, and political, cannot be maintained as a
matter of nonrational, emotional faith, but must be considered as
methods or instruments concerning which there should be rational
discussion and appraisal. George Santayana, one of America's great
philosophers, had this in mind when he wrote"
To love one's country, unless that love is quite blind and
lazy, must involve a distinction between the country's
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actual condition and its inherent ideal; and this dis-
tinction in turn involves a demand for changes and for
effort. 24
Jefferson, who more than any other was responsible for American sen-
sitivity to libertarian considerations, said in his Second Inaugural
Address:
If there be any among us who would wish to dissolve this
Union or to change its republican form , let them stand
undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which error
of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to
combat it. 25
Much more could be said to support and illustrate this principle, but
the point should be clear. Governments are designed to serve indi-
viduals. No political system, institution, or nation is worthy of
preservation, however venerated by familiarity, or even past success,
unless it offers freedom for the individual to develop in accordance with
the dictates of his own reason.
It has been said that "democracy is the political aspect of the
2 6
assertion of the supreme importance of the individual" . To the ex-
tent that this remains true of American Democracy, we must devote
our energies, even our lives to its preservation. If it becomes per-
verted or distracted by less worthy goals, then we must reform it, or
else denounce it entirely. And, if another political order appears, on
rational analysis, to offer promise of greater self-fulfillment for the
individual, then we must be willing to experiment.
This bring us logically to a second requirement for a political
order under our philosophy of values . It is a natural extension of the
first, and forms the basis for positive governmental action, as opposed
to the essentially negative role of regulator and adjustor, i.e. , de-
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conflicts between individuals and groups of individuals. We have
seen that this negative function attempts to maintain, to the greatest
extent possible, the autonomy of each individual in the belief that
there is no other certain means to real progress. The positive role
arises from the asperation that man's progress toward his unknown
goal can actually be accelerated by additional governmental action,
over and above that required for the preservation of individual auton-
omy. The concept is that growth can be stimulated and latent po-
tential brought forth by creation of a favorable environment.
It might be helpful to visualize one aspect of human life as a
mammoth, continuing experiment which is the summation of many in-
dividual and group experiments. Then we can say that the first func-
tion of a political system is to insure that each individual is free to
conduct any experiment he finds attractive, subject only to the re-
striction that no experiment should be favored to the exclusion of
another. Our development precludes enforcement of any authoritative
judgment about which experiments should be conducted or how they
should proceed, The second governmental function, then, is en-
hancement of the capacity of each experimenter by broadening his
horizons and providing more and better working tools. This is the true
basis for governmental activity in such fields as education.,, welfare,
economics, housing , transportation, and communications, which has
expanded so greatly in the last few decades.
The second area of governmental activity is clearly more diffi-
cult than the first. For the distinction between legitimate growth
stimulation and tyrannical enforcement of authoritative parochialism
is easily confused or overlooked entirely. But this is precisely the
point. Santayana has said that a society must be judged by the
measure in which it enhances the life and capacities of its constituent
27
individuals. Is this not, in the final analysis, a necessary and
27
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sufficient measure of effectiveness for any political order? For ex-
ample, in the matter of governmental regulation of the business
community, decisions must not be based simply on such considerations
as the effect on the national product, a tradition of free enterprise, or
even, the supposed intentions of the framers of the constitution. Even
the widely accepted goal of a continually increasing "standard of
living" requires analysis on the basis of its impact on individual self-
fulfillment.
In summary, we have developed two functional bases for a
political order and the laws and decisions it enforces. First, in the
absence of certain knowledge about ultimate goals, it follows that the
first requirement is to safeguard the freedom of each individual to
apply his own specific hypotheses and experimental procedures to the
solution of problems, subject only to the restriction that he must not
by so doing deny equal freedom to others. The second requirement is
stimulation of growth to insure not only that experimentation does not
cease, but that it expands in scope and quality as the store of human
knowledge increases. The responsiveness principle which was de-
veloped earlier should be seen to be a necessary condition for the
effective accomplishment of these two objectives, i.e. , the political
system must not only permit peaceful change, but seek its purifying
influence as an antidote for error.
-33-
5. A Cybernetic Model.
Karl Deutsch, Professor of Political Science at Yale University,
in his book, The Nerves of Government, offers a theoretical model of
a political system derived from the theory of communication and con-
trol (often called by Norbert Wiener's term "cybernetics"). Deutsch
makes an interesting case for a concept of government as more a prob-
lem of steering capability than of power structure; and he shows
rather convincingly that steering is decisively a matter of communication
Our principle of responsiveness has direct application in Deutsch'
s
model in terms of feedback control.
Cybernetics, the systematic study of communication and control
in organizations of all kinds, is a conceptual scheme which repre-
sents a shift in the center of interest from drives to steering, and
from instincts to systems of decisions, regulation, and control, in-
28
eluding the noncyclical aspects of such systems. Deutsch expands
the concept as follows:
The viewpoint of cybernetics suggests that all organi-
zations are alike in certain fundamental characteristics
and that every organization is held together by communi-
cation.
. .
.It is communication, that is, the ability to
transmit messages and to react to them , that makes or-
ganizations; and it seems that this is true of organi-
zations of living cells in the human body as well as
of organizations of pieces of machinery in an elec-
tronic calculator, as well as of organizations of
thinking human beings in social groups. 29 [under-
lining supplied]
Is this not an essentially similar concept to that which we have
called responsiveness? The superiority of such a cybernetic model
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in its incorporation of learning and self-modification. Deutsch
explains:
All three of these [classical] models have long been felt
to be inadequate. Mechanism and the equilibrium concept
cannot represent growth and evolution. Organisms are
incapable of both accurate analysis and internal rearrange-
ment; and models of historical processes lacked inner
structure and quantitative predictability.
In the place of these obsolescent models, we now have
an array of self-controlling machines that react to their
environment, as well as to the results of their own
behavior; that store, process, and apply information;
and that have, in some cases a limited capacity to
learn. 30
The cybernetic model may be visualized as a self-modifying communi-
cations network or "learning net". The concept of "feedback" is
common to all self-modifying networks, whether they are electronic
control devices, nerve systems, or social organizations. Deutsch
points out that a system which incorporates feedback is often called
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a servomechanism , and defines it as a
. . .
.communications network that produces action in
response to an input of information, and includes the
results of its own action in the new information by which
it modifies its subsequent behavior . A simple feedback
network contains arrangements to react to an outside
event in a specified manner until a specified state of
affairs has been brought about.
. . .If the action of the
network has fallen short of reaching fully the sought
adjustment, it is continued; if it has overshot the mark,
it is reversed. Both continuation and reversal may take
place in proportion to the extent to which the goal has
not yet been reached. If the feedback is well designed,
the result will be a series of diminishing mistakes — a
dwindling series of under- and over-corrections con-
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or servomechanism is not adequate to its task (if it is
inadequately "dampened"), the mistakes may become
greater. The network may be "hunting" over a cyclical
or widening range of tentative and "incorrect" re-
sponses, ending in a breakdown of the mechanism. 32
Deutsch describes three kinds of feedback:
"Goal-seeking", the feedback of new external data
into a net whose operating channels remain unchanged;
and "learning", the feedback of external data for the
changing of these operating channels themselves ....
[and] the feedback and simultaneous scanning of
highly selected internal data, analogous to the problem
of what usually is called "consciousness" .33
In a specific application to our concern with a political order,
the first type of feedback corresponds to the direct response of a
political system, for which goals are essentially fixed, to the collec-
tive demands of the electorate. It produces relatively short>:term
solutions which have application only within the specific environment.
Contrary to popular opinion, but strictly in keeping with the theme of
this paper, it is interesting to note that Professor Nicholas Rashevsky,
who applied sophisticated mathematical techniques to an analysis of
socio-political models, found that a high degree of conformity in
demand (resulting from a low proportion of politically active individuals)
34
may tend to reduce the stability of a political system.
The "learning" variety of feedback involves more complex response
to changing environments, including readjustment of those internal
arrangements that determined its original goal, so that the political
system may change its goal, or set new goals, which it must then
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process often includes changes in the "operating rules" that deter-
mine how decisions are reached, and may result in modified or new
political institutions. It is significant, but not surprising, to find
that the learning capacity of a communications net, or a culture, is
closely related to its ability to survive and to spread.
The third type of feedback is a secondary device for improving
the efficiency of both the goal- seeking and the learning processes by
means of perceptive internal monitoring of information and relation-
ships existing within the network.
The cybernetic model then appears to be valuable in as much as
it provides a framework for understanding and analyzing a political
system as a dynamic whdfce. Feedback controls provide a means for
representing the capacity for self-steering autonomy, i.e., the self-
changing and self-enhancing mechanism, which is essential for long-
run survival of any system or organization in an environment which
can be expected to change continually and considerably.
Our philosophy of values leads us to accept Deutsch's hypoth-
esis that:
. . .
.No autonomous organization can remain indefinitely
self-sufficient by means of the set of data and resources
it commands at any one moment, or even by means of the
set of data and resources it has got into the practice of
receiving at any one time from its environment.
. .
.[The
concept] implies the eventual insufficiency of all
current, as well as of all predictable, routines for the
preservation of autonomy. ^^
It follows that a primary function of politics must be the development
of a range of significant techniques for accelerating needed innovation.
Previous sections of this paper have implied this requirement and hint-
ed at possible means for its accomplishment. In the final section
we shall develop what are perhaps the three most important of these
35
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techniques, at least in Western politics, which are majority rule,
the protection of minorities, and the institutionalization of dissent,
-38-
6. A Descriptive Analysis of American Legislative Institutions.
The legislature is an inseparable part of a larger political system.
Its character and function cannot be understood in isolation, but must
be viewed within an elaborate network of external relations , some of
which it has designed and developed for its own purposes and others
which have been thrust upon it involuntarily. In purely constitutional
terms, the American legislature is placed at the center of the political
system, having been awarded the principal tasks of government and
a major share of the powers presumed necessary to perform them. But
the framers of a constitution, no matter how detailed their prescrip-
tions, can do no more than outline the contours of power. Power
relationships among the branches of government and between the
government and private power systems are both complicated and
fluid; a document cannot protect power or insure initiative. The out-
comes of policy struggles are affected as much by the power of par-
ticular men and the force of circumstance as by the broad language
of the constitution.
Although it is by no means a purpose of this paper to assess or
even to trace the evolution of our Federal system, it is necessary to
understand the relationships which exist today between the National
Government on the one hand, and the constituent States on the other.
The conception on which the recent and expanding social and economic
legislation professes to rest is one which has been called cooperative
federalism, in which the States and the National Government are re-
garded as mutually complementary parts of a single governmental
mechanism all of whose powers are intended to realize the current
purposes of government according to their applicability to the prob-
lem at hand.
Two consequences are worthy of note here. First, it has been
argued that the cooperative conception of the federal relationship,
especially as it is realized in the policy of federal subsidy to the
states, tends to break down state initiative and to devitalize state
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policies. Actually, its effect has often been just the contrary in as
much as the states, competing as they do with one another to attract
investors, have not been able to embark separately upon expensive
programs of relief, social insurance, and sometimes even public
education. Thus, the uniformity born of National initiative has often
freed the States for creative experiments within the broad scope of
national policy. On the other hand, it is unquestionably true that
cooperative federalism invites further aggrandizement of national
power. Resting as it does primarily on the superior fiscal resources
of the National Government, cooperative federalism has become, for
better or for worse, a synonym for steadily increasing power of the
National Government in the stimulation and su pervision of local
policies
.
The second great structural principle of American Constitutional
Law is the doctrine of Separation of Powers. The notion of three
distinct functions of government approximating what we term the
legislative, the executive, and the judicial is at least as old as
Aristotle. Montesquieu incorporated the concept of "checks and
balances" which the framers of our Constitution believed necessary
to.prevent a single segment of the population — majority or minority •
from gaining complete control of the government. Further, they
insured that a variety of interests would be reflected by making each
branch accountable to different groups. A corollary to this doctrine
was the principle that legislative power cannot be delegated. How-
ever, the Supreme Court has recognized that in the face of the com-
plexity of the conditions that Congress is called upon to regulate,
it is impossible for that body to make all policy decisions. Accord-
ingly, it is now sufficient that Congress set down a general policy
and authorize administrative officials to make rules to carry the
general policy into effect. Thus the Court has sustained numerous
statutes granting in the total vast powers to administrative and
executive agencies such as the Interstate Commerce Commission and
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the Federal Communications Commission. Congress, however, always
retains the power to rescind its delegation or to alter the policies
enacted by those to whom it has given quasi-legislative discretion.
The constitutional separation of powers has been altered by
another significant development — the President's expanding role as
chief legislator. Today the President is expected to have a legislative
program of his own and to use his powers and prestige to secure its
adoption by Congress. In the interest both of unity of design and of
flexibility of detail, presidential power today takes increasing toll
from both ends of the legislative process — both from the formulation
of legislation and from its administration. It appears that as a
barrier capable of preventing fusion of presidential and congressional
power, the principle of the Separation of Powers has not retained much
of its original effectiveness.
As we have seen earlier, government, and especially democracy,
is fundamentally concerned with the relationship between the powers
of government and the liberties of individuals. Though both are
necessary, authority and liberty oppose each other in such fashion
that the growth of one of them implies the decline of the other. Dr.
Edward S. Corwin summed up the position of the United States con-
stitutional system in 1953:
What was once vaunted as a constitution of Rights, both
State rights and private rights, has been replaced to a
great extent by a Constitution of Powers . The Federal
System has shifted base in the direction of a consoli-
dated national power; within the National Government
itself there has been an increased flow of power in the
direction of the President; even judicial enforcement
of the Bill of Rights has faltered at times, in the pres-
ence of national emergency. 36
Recent years have seen continued Presidential ascendancy tempered,
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and even assisted, by a Supreme Court dynamically asserting indi-
vidual liberty, as originally defined by the Bill of Rights, subsequently
extended by the Fourteenth Amendment, and continually expanded by
the Court itself.
We turn now to a brief analysis of existing institutions and
current trends, in which we may find cause for both hope and concern.
The analysis with which this paper will conclude is neither compre-
hensive nor greatly detailed. It is intended to be only an illustration
of the type of rational (in the sense defined earlier) analysis for which
our preliminary emphasis on basic principles has prepared a foun-
dation and a scientific methodology.
i
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7. A Prescriptive Analysis.
Our philosophy of values has led us to adopt supremacy of the in-
dividual as the guiding principle of government. We have concluded,
first, that the state must limit the powers of its citizens only as far
as these powers are mutually destructive — it must withdraw no liberty
except to add a greater one. Secondly, we have concluded that govern-
ment must create conditions which enhance each individual's capacity
for growth. It must do this without denying him dignity — without
depriving him of autonomous control over his behavior - allowing each
individual to determine his own rate of learning and his own priority of
effort. Finally, since government must survive in order to perform its
function, we have concluded that it must be capable of rational, auto-
nomous (self-determined) innovation of its own structure as its environ-
ment and its citizens change. Underlying and supporting the entire
development has been our postulate that in a world of absolute, uni-
versal and observable ethics, the collective choices of mankind will,
over the very long term, be good choices whenever individual prefer-




However, we cannot assume a standard of excellence which is
above ordinary persons . The form of a political system must be one
which states and individuals can attain. General principles are not
easy to apply to hard, concrete cases. Therefore, these principles
must be related to specific means for implementation, i.e. , to in-
stitutions, laws, and public officials, for example. But what means
should we adopt? We should be very skeptical about the existence of
an ideal form of government; there is ample evidence that optimal
solutions in the real world are not unique, even in a specified environ-
ment. We might say that democracy, to the extent that it supports
supremacy of the individual, is ideal. But this implies little about its
tangible form. What we must have is a means for making decisions.
For unless all members of a society agree on all policies all the time,
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there must be a set of rules for settling conflicts. In considering the
American political system, the question we must ask, and ask con-
tinually, is whether our decision-making processes are consistent
with the principles we have developed so carefully.
At the highest level, the American scheme for decision-making
might be described as one of majority rule, constrained by protected
minorities and institutionalized dissent. Although this is not the only
decision rule compatible with our principles, it does appear to offer a
framework within which our objectives can be realized. Clinton
Rossiter comments that the American process has been one of
. . .
.arriving openly, through discussion and compromise,
at decisions in keeping with the reasonable wishes of the
majority, and then of pursuing these decisions with the
fullest possible respect for the legitimate rights of the
minority. ^ 7
Deutsch suggests that autonomous organizations may be prone to
overvalue internal or parochial information, as well as familiar data
from the past, as against data and information derived from new and
wider ranges of experience. Majority rule, as opposed to decision
processes requiring a higher degree of agreement, offers greater re-
sponsiveness to needed innovation. Deutsch makes the point clearly:
Majority rule in the Western manner permits ... .a change
to be carried out much earlier and thus much faster. At
the same time, Western traditions for the protection of
minorities may prevent majority-imposed rates of change
from disrupting the integrity and dignity of dissenting
individuals or groups, or of breaking the bonds and
communication channels of social cohesion. Finally,
the institutionalization of dissent, and the provision of
acceptable channels and modes for the expression of
criticism and self-criticism, of counterproposals and
of new suggestions, protect not merely the majority of
37






yesterday but also provide potential growing points for
the majorities of tomorrow. Taken together, majority
rule, minority protection, and institutionalized dissent,
reinforced by highly conscious, analytical, critical and
combinatorial modes of thought, provide Western so-
cieties and political systems with an unusually wide
range of resources and instrumentalities for rapid social
learning and innovation. °
The question of majority rule versus minority rights is not easily
resolved. Robert G. McCloskey suggests that there is a basic am-
bivalence in American politics which steadfastly refuses to resolve
the inherent contradiction between the two ideals . One of his illus-
trations gives good insight into the kind of subtle relationships which




.must surely be one of the most curious
repositories of paradox that ingenious political man has
yet devised. This was an agency set up to express the
will of American democracy, and we might legitimately
expect that the institution would reflect the nation's
answer to the eternal democratic question about majority
rule versus minority rights. But it gives us no such
answer, unless the failure to provide one is a kind of
answer in itself. In the first place, as everyone knows,
the very creation of the two houses involved a contra-
diction: the House was dedicated to the proposition that
the majority must rule; the Senate, to the idea that
minority rights are sacrosanct. But it goes far beyond
that. Within each of the two houses we find the same
contradiction embodied. Consider, for example, the
Senate's famous filibuster tradition. Under the present
rule, the vote of two-thirds of the Senators present is
necessary to halt debate and no limit at all can be im-
posed on debate on a motion to change the rules. Thus
the minority enjoys, theoretically, an absolute power to
frustrate the will of the majority. But on the other hand,
there is no real doubt that a majority vote of the Senate
could kill the filibuster rule tomorrow — including the
rule that purportedly forbids cloture on a rule change..
38
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The Constitution gives each house the right to determine
its own rules and that right is lodged in the majority of the
Senate. So what we have here is not a choice between
majority rule and minority rights, not even (in theory)
a compromise between them, but an absolute represen-
tation of both ideas.
A similar paradox is mirrored in the procedures of the
House. We hear much nowadays about the Rules Committee
and its power to prevent the majority from expressing it-
self, a power analogous to that of a filibustering minority
in the Senate. Yet a discharge petition signed by a
majority of the House can at any time wrest a bill from the
Committee's grasp and thus override the minority. Again
we see the idea of majority rule and the idea of minority
rights existing side by side. In practice, of course, in
both Senate and House the two ideas are often compromised.
The minority refrains from exercising its theoretically ab-
solute veto unless the issue seems really vital to minority
interests; in return for such self-restraint the majority
does not invoke its own absolute power to override. But
apparently there is symbolic value in maintaining the formal
existence of the essential paradox. It comforts those who
believe in both majority rule and minority rights and have
never bothered to choose between them. 39
McCloskey has no real quarrel with this so-called ambivalence,
nor should we. Later he says:
The literature of American political thought, our political
institutions, and our p61itical behavior all indicate that
our ideology may be a conglomerate of mutually inconsis-
tent beliefs. If so, it may be idle to seek for "the" Amer-
ican tradition, for a "consensus" in any usual sense of
the word. Perhaps our only really basic quality of mind
is the pragmatic spirit that can tolerate such a state of
affairs and build an enduring polity upon it. ^
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But McCloskey only hints at the fundamental significance of the phe-
nomena he describes so well. He seeks idological consensus at too
low a level in the means-ends chain. Neither majority rule nor minority
rights are proper goals in themselves. Neither, for that matter, are
"separation of powers" nor inalienable "States Rights", nor any of the
other so-called checks and balances which we have inherited. They
are but devices, albeit ingenious devices, which have from time to
time been found useful in preserving the supremacy and the autonomy
of the individual. Viewed in this light -- as means, rather than ends --
there is no inconsistency and no basis for valuing one higher than
another.
Again we have come to the crux of the matter — all that has come
before and all that follows in this thesis has been dedicated to demon-
strating a need and a method for distinguishing between inalterable
goals on the one hand, and opportune means for their attainment on
the other. Irrational devotion to a specific institution or system in
isolation from the higher purpose is equivalent to blockage of the ex-
ternal feedback channels of a communications network which results
demonstrably and inevitably in instability of the system and eventual
loss of autonomy.
Let us consider briefly the highly emotional issue of "states'
rights". Are we not able to conclude immediately and unquestionably
that states, per se, have no inherent, no inaiienable, rights? To the
extent that legislative decisions at the state (or local) level best
provide for individual fulfillment, a states' rights concept is jus-
tified. If a high degree of autonomy in the state governments is
necessary and effective to prevent tyrannical regimentation by the
National Government, then we should support and perhaps even in-
crease the powers of the states. But when we champion states' rights
we must be sure that our basis is increased responsiveness of legis-
lation to the collective will, and not, for example, maintenance of the
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status quo according to the preferences of an unrepresentative minority
in whose hands the balance of state political power often resides. We
must not fear innovation, but welcome.it as essential to growth, and
thus progress, even survival.
On the question of currently expanding Presidential influence in
the legislative process, there is perhaps greater cause for concern.
The fear is not violation of the "sacred" doctrine of "separation of
powers", but, again, loss of responsiveness. Despite the wide base
of political support necessary to elect a President, the Executive branch
of government is remote from the channels of public communication.
Election of a President, even by a decisive margin, does not necessari-
ly constitute a popular mandate for the President's or his party's plat-
form. For the electorate is permitted only to choose between pre-
determined alternatives — all of which it may consider unhappy ones.
Furthermore, the polidcasiand programs of a President may diverge
rapidly from his election-year platform. Four years of essentially
free rein, with Congressional action limited largely to approving or
rejecting predetermined legislative packages of vast and lasting con-
sequence, is hardly a blueprint for progress. Our principle of progress
through broad participation requires that significant policies and pro-
grams be chosen rationally after widespread study and intercourse con-
cerning alternatives. It is perhaps possible for a miniaturized
version of such a process to operate on the natural diversity available
within the Executive branch of the government. But even if the eventual
legislative product were rationally perfect, bypassing the (two-way)
channels of public communication, and elimination of the reflective and
educational processes would result in an ever broadening gulf between
individual preferences and legislative action — which is, by our
definition, the kind of unresponsiveness that brings instability and
failure to a cybernetic system. Autonomy of the individual and human
dignity are not consistent with the imposition of generally unwanted
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legislation, no matter how "rational" it may seem to an "enlightened"
minority. If the minority opinion is indeed rational, it can (and will
eventually, we postulate) become the majority opinion; the vehicle
of change is communications, in its broadest sense. It. would appear,
then, that it is a necessary function of the Congress, with its inherent
diversity of interest and opinion, to participate actively and publicly
in the formulation of policies, programs, and legislative alternatives,
providing, as it were, a public information center and national forum
for the exposition and evaluation of conflicting ideas. The proper legis-
lative function is largely one of communications to and from the elec-
41
torate; and it is this function which Executive legislation appears
unable to provide. To argue that the slow processes of Congressional
debate and reflection are inefficient luxuries which the demands of the
modern age will not permit, is to misunderstand the true meaning of
efficiency, or to assert that the goals and policies of a restricted
group are, or can be, sufficiently correct to pursue them unhesitatingly.
Such an approach gains rapid response by restricting its information
and feedback channels . It can be tolerated during short periods of
crisis, but becomes self-destroying if adopted as standard procedure.
This argument has direct application to the tendency toward
secrecy and censorship. Communication of preferences of individuals
and groups to the "governing minority", with responsiveness at every
level, and, communication from government to its citizens of factual
information concerning internal and external conditions, are both vital
for prevention of error. Blockage of the first path is oppression of
dissenting opinion, against which a sufficient case has been made.
41
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Secrecy and censorship result in blockage of the second path, which
denies citizens the information necessary for determining rational pre-
ferences. Such practices are clearly self-defeating. If it is true, for
example, as elements of the press and others from time to time have
suggested, that information available to the American public concerning
happenings in Viet Nam (tactical information excluded) is censored and
"interpreted" to elicit response favorable to Administration policies,
then we are embarked on a dangerous course. Or consider the apparent
suppression of evidence in the Warren Commission's report of its in-
vestigation of President Kennedy's assassination, especially the sealing
of certain pertinent records for a period of 75 years. This is an un-
mistakable trend in the wrong direction in as much as it implies distrust
of individual autonomy, subordination of the principle of supremacy of
the individual, and lack of confidence in the collective judgment of
the citizenry. Even the slightest acquiescence to the doctrine that
government should decide what is best for the people and control their
behavior accordingly, is a step toward loss of both individual and
political autonomy.
Our principle equips us to wrestle with the knotty question of the de-
gree of governmental: activity in business. Henry M. Wriston captures
the essence of the problem:
The Bill of Rights was not designed for corporations; free
enterprise is only one fruit of liberty, not its root. Prop-
erty and business exist for the benefit of individuals and
have no inherent rights. ^2
Pennington Haile is more specific, especially concerning the frequent
lament over socialistic tendencies:
We tend.
. . .to confuse resistance to "socialistic ideas"
with the protection of the real freedom of the individual.
. . .
Franklin Roosevelt was cursed for introducing "socialism"
42






when he established a measure of governmental control of
business. But it may well be true that only by such steps
was an eventual violent revolution prevented and all that
could be maintained of capitalist society preserved.
Social Security was bitterly resisted at first; now we
would not dispense with it if we could. . . .Such steps
that the complexity and changing nature of our society
make necessary do not always make a man less free.
Certainly helplessness and dependence on others do more
to crush the spirit of freedom. Surely too, any tendency
to stifle originality, to compel conformity, and to punish
non-conformance do so. .. .It is a hard lesson but one
that must be learned — that some yielding to a measure
of socialism is the only way a free society can success-
fully resist the pressures that otherwise may well insure
the spread of communism. ^3
What of our foreign policy, in particular, economic aid programs
and participation in the United Nations? Again, Haile's thinking
presents clearly the position dictated by our principles:
One outstanding example of the misapplication of
principles said to be derived from our heritage is the
platform developed by the group now known in our
country as the Extreme Right. Those who support it
claim to be the real guardians of the true traditions of
the United States. They counsel withdrawal from the
United Nations, diminishing or terminating all foreign
aid, giving up all negotiations with the Communist
world and concentration upon the "Communist meance"
here at home . Their point of view appeals to young and
old and is really based on a pathetic if dangerous nos-
talgia for a world gone by. It represents a frontier
spirit in a world without frontiers. It wants to preserve
or to re-create conditions that can no longer be main-
tained, yet its appeal is nevertheless powerful because,
if those conditions could recur, many of the problems
we face would disappear. But they cannot — isolation,
self-sufficiency, security through our own armed
strength belong to an age gone forever.
Most of us realize this. But we do not perhaps see
what a perversion of our basic principles is here involved.
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pany, Inc., 1965) p. 137- .
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Our true heritage must impell us toward full participation
in the United Nations, toward maximum economic assist-
ance^", and toward continuing negotiation even in the face
of frustration. It must do so because, if man is a crea-
ture of reason, all these steps are necessary to create
the very possibility of peace on an overcrowded earth,
now equipped with nuclear weapons of destruction. 4
The United Nations has neither the form nor the goal of World
government. We are rightfully hesitant to surrender any significant
portion of our national autonomy. But it is helping to prepare men's
minds for the day when the rights of man become the only rights
,
and
all governments are dedicated to their preservation. On this basis alone
it serves our best interests and deserves our unreserved individual and
National support.
Is it appropriate, in the light of our highest goals, to insist that
governments receiving our economic assistance be "democratic"
after our own pattern? We are naive to think that a new nation emerging
suddenly from colonial subservience or primitive ignorance will survive
and prosper under a system we derived under such vastly different
circumstances. All we should require as a prerequisite for economic
aid, and all we can hope for the future, is that men and nations will
dedicate themselves to the principle of supremacy of the individual.
To attempt to impose more than that of our system is itself a violation
of the principle
.
The means for political improvement are personal as well as in-
stitutional. Having examined briefly an assortment of American
institutions
,
practices and policies , it is appropriate to conclude
this analysis with emphasis on the individuals who direct and carry
out the processes we have described. Spinoza, who was convinced
that democracy is the most reasonable form of government, believed that:
The defect of democracy is its tendency to put mediocrity






by limiting office to men of "trained skill". Democracy
has still to solve the problem of enlisting the best ener-
gies of men while giving to all alike the choice of those,
among the trained and fit , by whom they wish to be ruled.
^
Plato's writing demonstrates that public office, in his time as now,
was not always awarded to those most fit:
In simple matters, like shoe-making, we think only a
specially-trained person will serve our purpose; in
politics we presume that every one who knows how to
get votes knows how to administer a city or state.
The problem of political philosophy is to devise a
method of barring incompetence and knavery from public
office, and of selecting and preparing the best to rule
for the common good. 46
Santayana echoed the philosopher-king concept of Plato's Republic
in his assertion that:
The ideal government would be a synthesis of democracy
and aristocracy in which only the best would rule; but
every man would have an equal chance to make himself
worthy to be numbered among the best. '
Again we see that our philosophy, far from calling for radical new
solutions, reaffirms the wisdom of the ages. Philosopher-kings may
be out of reach, but "there is no substitute for a system of recruitment
that brings men of talent and imagination into every rank of the public
service, and for a code of responsible behavior that gives them pride
48
in their tasks" . This is the real need of today; for men of integrity
and vision will overcome clumsy institutions and correct faulty prac-
tices. The key to this task is education — education available equally
45






Rossiter, C, Op. Cit., p. 68
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to all who are capable of its discipline. Then, as in Plato's
Republic,
Career will be open to talent wherever it is born. This
is democracy of the schools — a hundredfold more honest
and more effective than a democracy of the polls. ^9
We might add a note of caution. Plato is not advocating technical
education, for such was virtually unknown. Technical experts have
their place in government as in all of life. But in positions of true
leadership, technical expertise is not enough:
. . .
.Leadership belongs to prudence, not to expertness;
rather than the bearer of a technical ability, a leader
is supposed to be a man of virtue, a man of human ex-
perience, a man who knows men, who loves them, and
succeeds in persuading them. Perfect order would want
experts to be kept in subordinate positions under leaders
who should be good men rather than good experts. °
Henry M. Wriston echoes our philosophy and provides motivation
for allocation of every available resource to truly democratic public
education:
The basic natural resource of the United States is its
people. It follows inescapably that the first goal to
be pursued — at all levels, federal, state, local, and
private — should be the development of each individual
to his fullest potential. ^1
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8. Summary and Conclusions.
This thesis has attempted to use the scientific methodology of
Operations Research to derive a philosophical model of man, and then,
to demonstrate its application to the solution of political problems.
The development led us to adopt supremacy of the individual as the
headstone of any political system, with every institution and law sub-
ordinate and dedicated to that principle
.
A cybernetic model, which incorporates the capability for autono-
mous modification of its own structure in response to changes in both
internal and external environments, was presented as a suitable frame-
work for analysis of a political system. The necessity for continual
responsiveness and innovation in a political system was demonstrated
by analogy to the error-correcting feedback function in a complex com-
munications network.
Finally, an attempt was made to show that the only certain basis
for net positive progress is control of decision-making processes by
the freely expressed and broadly based preferences of an autonomous,
informed citizenry, reflected through unobstructed feedback-like
communication channels
.
It is hoped that this formal development has given substance and
clarity to the widely held, but vaguely understood American principles
of liberty, freedom, equality, self-evident truths , inalienable rights
,
and human dignity. Further, it is hoped that American political in-
stitutions and methods for goal achievement have been placed in clearer
perspective as means rather than ends in themselves.
One aspect of government is necessarily a power structure for
making and enforcing policies and decisions concerning human behavior.
We tend to concern ourselves too much with the outward manifestations
of this structure, and too often not at all with control of the structure
itself. It is probably safe to assume that the American political
system is adequate for the present, perhaps for some time to come:
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With all its defects, it does nonetheless provide a high
probability that any active and legitimate group will
make itself heard effectively at some stage in the pro-
cess of decision. This is no mean thing in a political
system. 52
Bit it has not been a static system. It has evolved, and by evolving
it has survived. We must not allow its tangible, outward form to divert
us from its true purpose. We must not only be willing to accept change
when it is needed, but also plan for it. To that end, we must continually
experiment, drawing on the natural diversity and creativity of the en-
tire citizenry to suggest imaginative, new alternatives.
The writer has not succeeded in institutionalizing a suitable struc-
ture for innovation, i.e. , for autonomous steering feedback. It may be
sufficient simply to be aware of the need for fundamental innovation.
In its absence, however, immediate and interim goals must be con-
tinually and consciously examined in the light of the one unchanging
goal.
Pennington Haile illuminates the path we must followt
The tradition of individual freedom maintained by govern-
ment to the greatest degree compatible with existing con-




.Man's right to reason and to investigate and interpret
his world [must] be sustained for the individual as a free
inquirer and not as one directed by the state to arrive at
results in accordance with dogmatic assumption of any kind. ^
We Americans are fortunate indeed to be heirs and participants in
so magnificent an experiment. The challenge and the responsibility
are as immense today as when Jefferson conceived them:
We feel that we are acting under obligations not confined
to the limits of our own society. It is impossible not to
be sensible that we are acting for all mankind; that cir-
cumstances denied to others, but indulged to us, have
52
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imposed on us the duty of proving what is the degree of
freedom and self-government in which a society may
venture to leave its individual members ....
We exist.
. .
.as standing proofs that a government , so
modelled as to rest continually on the will of the whole
society, is a practicable government. ^4
54
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